Politics in Minnesota: The Weekly Report - Vol. 3, Issue 6 - 8/3/2007
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Sarah Janecek
Publisher
The Bridge
Like everyone else in Minnesota, we can't focus on much of anything other than the collapse of the I-35W bridge. Hence this special bridge-only edition of the Weekly Report. Released MnDOT documents are summarized after Bits & Pieces.
The Pride
No state does state chauvinism better than Minnesota. We've always touted our quality of life and our people...that somehow we're different and better than the rest of the country. In all of the media coverage, the best of what makes Minnesota, Minnesota, could be observed in the regular people who found themselves involved, whether as victims, bystanders or the rank and file of responders and caregivers doing their jobs. The Pols
Tragedies are stunning events in the lives of politicians and in which careers are made or broken.
Our current roster of political leadership justifies Minnesota chauvinism, as well. GOP Governor Tim Pawlenty has been nothing short of awesome. Calling the tragedy the historic catastrophe it is. A commanding in charge presence determined to get the answers to the big why, including hiring an outside firm to review Minnesota's transportation system inside and out. Not to diminish Pawlenty's work, because those who know him expect nothing less than the best he has delivered, but there is another pol who has truly distinguished himself.
That pol is Minneapolis Mayor R.T. Rybak.
Truth be told, we've been working all week on a story about Rybak's failed leadership in Minneapolis. Maybe we'll get there, eventually, maybe not. Rybak has been spectacular in keeping his focus--and his comments in the media--on the human stories. Given his years of blaming Pawlenty for everything that's wrong with Minneapolis because of Local Government Aid (LGA) cuts, it would have been so easy for Rybak to devolve into finger-pointing. He did not.
Like Pawlenty, Rybak has made us proud. Actually, all key players have made us proud, including Minneapolis Police Chief Tim Dolan and Hennepin County Sheriff Rich Stanek [Although it's too bad he's sporting that goofy beard.]
Unfortunately, there was a former politician who did not rise to the occasion. On KARE-11 mere hours after the tragedy, former Jesse Ventura Administration Commissioner of Transportation Elwyn Tinklenberg was oddly standing in front of the dark Capitol building blathering (there is no better word) about MnDOT's "constant deterioration of the budget, constant layoffs, failure to replace people," etc. Most of what he said was not only not true, but it was crass in the immediate aftermath of the bridge falling down.
Our Congressional leadership has been awkward. U.S. Sens. Norm Coleman (R) and Amy Klobuchar (D), along with U.S. Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN5), flew in from Washington and were on the ground for about two hours, just enough time for a chopper tour and a press conference. Detractors thought they were grandstanding and attempting to score political points. Unbeknownst to the three and the others delivering remarks at that press conference, much of it was preempted by President George Bush, who delivered his first comments from the White House at the same time. The national networks switched to Bush. We suppose that Coleman, Klobuchar and Ellison found themselves in a "damned if we do, damned if we don't" position. There was the need to come to Minnesota for the camera shot, but also the need to get back to Washington to get needed funding into the federal process. But others could have done that, and frankly, we were surprised that none of the three thought to screw Washington and spend the afternoon with the people doing the hard work.
The Media
Stanley S. Hubbard, chairman and CEO of Hubbard Broadcasting, deserves nothing less than a standing ovation.
KSTP TV started reporting on the bridge in its Wednesday six p.m. newscast with the first live chopper shot at 6:22. The station stayed on the air covering the story live for the next 25 hours straight. We cannot begin to calculate what that cost. Never mind the costs of the employee overtime, or the expense of keeping helicopters live in the air for 13 hours straight, there were no commercials. None. The first commercial break was a short one during last night's ten p.m. newscast.
Hubbard, himself, was in the news room Wednesday night, observing his hard working news team. At no time was cost an issue in terms of coverage. He just let his team run, and run, they did.
Thank you, Stanley Hubbard. That was some gift you gave to Minnesota.
[More media news in Bits & Pieces.]
The Critics
Many a media commentator made mention of Minnesota not raising the gas tax since 1988, implying that the bridge collapse was government's fault, and in particular, the fault of GOP Gov. Tim Pawlenty.
The gist of the critics is perhaps best exemplified in the first column written by the Star Tribune’s Nick Coleman.
His first column--posted online yesterday when we didn't even know the
number--let alone the names--of people killed, was mysteriously NOT printed in
the hard copy of the Star Tribune.
For half a dozen years, the motto of state government and particularly that of Gov. Tim Pawlenty has been No New Taxes. It's been popular with a lot of voters and it has mostly prevailed. So much so that Pawlenty vetoed a 5-cent gas tax increase - the first in 20 years - last spring and millions were lost that might have gone to road repair. And yes, it would have fallen even if the gas tax had gone through, because we are years behind a dangerous curve when it comes to the replacement of infrastructure that everyone but wingnuts in coonskin caps agree is one of the basic duties of government.
Coleman and like-minded critics displayed a shocking lack of understanding about how Minnesota funds and runs transportation.
"No New Taxes" had nothing to do with what happened, yesterday.
In general, the major bridges the federal government has built become the responsibility of states to maintain, and states routinely seek and are granted federal funding to help with the maintenance. The maintenance work being done on the I-35W bridge by Progressive Contractors, Inc., out of St. Michael, Minnesota, was on the list of projects on the 2007-2009 State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP) list. Right there on page 116 of the report is the I-35W bridge. The $3.3 million price tag was being paid mostly by the federal government ($2.97 million) and not the state ($330,000).
The National Bridge Inventory conducted by the federal government in 2003 reported that the bridge had a "sufficiency" rating of 50% on a scale of 120. That’s not great, but that's where about 80,000 of the country’s bridges stand. The significant finding of that Inventory, however, was that structurally, the bridge "meets minimum tolerable limits to be left in place as-is."
The federal government didn’t flag dire structural issues; neither did MnDOT.
Pawlenty could have raised the gas tax $50 a gallon and nothing would have happened. The structural condition of the bridge was not on anyone’s radar screen. At this point, that appears to be the real issue: All levels of government may have failed us.
But, specifically, Pawlenty and his administration have not. Those who blame
Pawlenty and the Republicans for not raising the state’s gas tax since 1988
may want to review their legislative history. From 1988-1996, the Democrats
controlled both houses of the state legislature. Transportation funding
increase efforts stalemated among Democrats because urban DFLers wanted a
permanent funding source for transit (the state gas tax is constitutionally
dedicated to roads).
From 1996-2006, the Republicans controlled the House and the Democrats held the Senate. To be sure, "no new taxes" prevailed during those years. The last several years, the Legislature has sent funding increase packages that have been too rich in tax increases. The last one included a ten-cent gas tax increase along with an option by local governments--not the people--to raise the sales tax for transit. These weren’t realistic packages. They were meant to embarrass the Governor.
Nevertheless, no matter how much money government has, it can’t fix a bridge that’s not on a list of bridges that need fixing.
[For the record, in the 1990s, your publisher did some work for the state’s highway construction companies. She lobbied to increase the gas tax by a nickel, and obviously, lost. She believe the state does need to raise the gas tax (she happens to like to drive). If Democrats were serious about increasing transportation funding and not political grandstanding, they would send Pawlenty a simple nickel increase bill. Bet he'd sign it…even before this tragedy.]
Finally, thoughts and prayers to everyone at Progressive Contractors (P.C.I.).
Owner Mike McGray runs a fine construction business, and from all we
know at this point, it appears he lost at least one worker.
The Department
The bridge collapse--in what's sure to be an excruciatingly painful
process--will put the spotlight on what anyone who has worked in Minnesota
transportation policy has known for decades: MnDOT is a mess. No one
administration or political party is to blame. The Rudy Perpich (DFL)
Administration (1982-1990), the Arne Carlson (R) Administration
(1990-1998), the Jesse Ventura Administration (1998-2002) and the
Tim Pawlenty Administration (2002-to present) have all made the same
call. There are other, sexier things to fund rather than existing
infrastructure and that's what's happened.
Those who have griped about it over the years, mainly the highway contractors,
their subcontractors and the unions, never got very far because their
interests seemed so self-serving. There was no traction among the general
public, who thought new four-lane highways, buildings and stadiums were sexier
than roads and bridges, too.
MnDOT has well-documented needs (see last story) without the means to pay for
them. Nationally, funding infrastructure needs has suffered the same "not
sexy" problem, along with economics 101, funding guns v. butter. In Minnesota,
there are no guns to pay for, but there are people funding needs that weren't
in most of the government budgets of the 20th century. There was no "E" for
early in the current E-12 education system and funding formulas (the funding
of which consumes about half the state's current budget). There was no sense
that government needed to provide health insurance for
myriad
categories of people.
Back to the Pawlenty Administration. There's added transportation funding
rancor there that exceeds not just raising the gas tax. When Pawlenty first
named Lt. Gov. Carol Molnau to be his Transportation Commissioner,
hopes in the transportation community were high. As a legislator, Molnau
chaired a transportation funding committee in the House. She "got" the MnDOT
mess. The expectation was that she would straighten it out. She did not, for
reasons we simply don't know but surmise to be the ones we outlined above--no
strong political direction to do the dirty work.
But the Pawlenty Administration, unlike previous administrations, made the
MnDOT mess worse. The Department has actually pushed for increasing truck
sizes and weights on existing road and bridge infrastructure. These increases
were first sought by the paper industry, which is now joined by other shippers
in seeking the increases.
[Publisher's note: For many years, she lobbied for trains and against trucks.
The trains are right: There is damage to roads and bridges with heavier
trucks. But the shippers are also right: Freight train rates are high, and
adding insult to injury, in most places, there's only one railroad company
offering service on a particular line. Note the conversation is about truck
weights, not sizes. The trucks lost the triple-trailer truck war in Minnesota
long ago.]
Bits & Pieces
Minneapolis Mayor R.T. Rybak, with the help of highly respected aide, Mike Christensen, is organizing the business community today to figure out how best to not let the bridge tragedy disrupt commerce in the city.
As the bridge fell Wednesday night, the members of the Republican National Committee, in town to plan for the 2008 convention, were on the 50th floor of the IDS building for a reception. We hear the mood was somber as the group looked out onto the river.
Today's Washington Post captures the first big test and success of the first responder system designed for a post-9/11 world.
A number of television reporters in town have found it awkward to interview the American Red Cross' Twin Cities chapter director Ted Canova. That's because Canova was the long-time news director for WCCO TV. Some of the awkwardness we've observed happens when Canova launches into asking for donations. That's a good thing to do, but we'll point out the crass thing before someone else does. The tragedy will help the Red Cross, which laid off 24 of its 109 workers earlier this year.
Another good move made by Stan Hubbard and others in the Hubbard media empire was to knock syndicated programming off its radio properties for better local coverage. For example, FM 107's Kevyn Burger did an awesome four hours instead of her usual two the morning after the bridge collapsed. [Burger, by the way is doing fabulously well in her battle with breast cancer. You can monitor her progress on her blog.]
Wish we could comment on other media coverage, particularly that of WCCO, KTLK and KSTP AM radio coverage. We simply didn't listen; we were too busy because we were glued to computers and television screens.
Editor & Publisher details Star Tribune and St. Paul Pioneer Press coverage here.
On the right, Michael Brodkorb, who blogs on the highly influential Minnesota Democrats Exposed, appears to be keeping good track of what key policymakers are saying about the politics of the bridge collapse.
On the left, MNPublius.com writes a thoughtful piece on keeping the politics out of the conversation.
By Thursday evening, media coverage had been digested into tabloid shows like "The Insider," and even "The View" talked about the enormous roster of "structurally deficient" bridges. A clip replayed on The Insider said that the bridge-collapse video was released by someone who wasn't even supposed to release it. That alone might be an interesting story.
One subtext to network television anchors are the subtle patronization and framing of the "good & simple folk of Middle America." They ask hazy leading questions and then when the emergency services provider chokes up, they go in for the slow zoom. Usually it's positive - Brian Williams reflecting on 'Minnesota Nice' sounded genuine - but it probably won't be hard to notice a certain cloying patronization from the national media between now and the RNC next fall. We've been packaged, recycled & sent out on the satellite uplink.
FOX anchor Shepherd Smith roamed into Minneapolis seeking the already-iconized school bus story, backed by a piano track rising in crescendo. One could easily imagine someone like Dustin Hoffman's character in Wag the Dog, chain-smoking at the satellite van in the Red Cross parking lot, as he fades up the piano slider. "Pulls 'em from the bus. Beautiful. It's gonna be an Emmy!!" It's really amazing how they can package reality so quickly.
The Mighty Wurlitzer of televised outrage has begun: By 11 p.m. Thursday, MSNBC General Manager Dan Abrams, CNN's Nancy Grace and, of course, FOX's Bill O'Reilly competed to posture their outrage over the bridge maintenance reports. As long as viewers keep gazing, it's a win for the producers.
One striking element of each cable news network's coverage yesterday was how all the viewer-submitted media came under FOX's "U-Report", CNN's iCNN and MSNBC's First Person brands. After the 7/7 London Tube bombings, where cellphone snaps provided the major harrowing images of that event, national media has developed whole brands to collect this kind of material. Of course, the Star Tribune and Minnesota Public Radio always run public-submitted material as well, but it was interesting that it became the 'major national branding' angle to everything.
Noah Kunin, who blogs at blanked-out.com, has the misfortune to live just a few hundred yards from the bridge collapse, as detailed in the post "35W just came down right in front of my house"; his house has now been evacuated and he's been interviewed by the spectrum of national media; he posted many pictures as well. (Kunin was last seen in the Kennedy Campaign web server password affair last September) Kunin said on his site he believes he and his girlfriend are the only civilians allowed in the exclusion zone. Kunin thanked Jeff Passolt of FOX 9 for helping put them in touch with the proper officials. His friend Aaron Landry at s4xton.com handled the media contacts and the website while Kunin scrambled yesterday.
A Pioneer Press article by Julio Ojeda-Zapata viewed the bridge collapse as what video-blogger Chuck Olsen called "a seminal local moment in 'citizen journalism'" as regular people documented the disaster. Olsen posted a video on MnStories.com.
Liveblogging (IE frequently updated blog posts at a fixed address) took place on a number of sites, including Metroblogging Minneapolis and MnSpeak.com. E-Democracy.org has an excellent, exhaustive Wiki page including many links to Flickr pages. The nearest neighborhood paper, aptly titled The Bridge, has many stories as well.
MnDOT Released Document Summary
MnDOT has released five documents on its website relating specifically to the I-35W bridge (bridge number 9340) which we have packaged into a zip file (35 MB). The files include an outside consultant review, a University of Minnesota Civil Engineering field report, two brief status summary documents, and, most troubling, a MnDOT "Fracture Critical" engineering summary which reveals in candid descriptions and shocking photographs the deterioration of many critical bridge elements. What follows is PIM's Dan Feidt's summary of the relevant parts of the documents:
A 299-page draft report prepared for MnDOT by the URS Corporation of Minneapolis entitled, "Fatigue Evaluation and Redundancy Analysis" for Bridge No. 9340, released July 2006.
-
It recommended "steel plating of all 52 fracture critical truss members" via
"additional plates bolted to the existing webs" as the best retrofit option.
-
The bridge was designed in accordance with the 1961 AASHO Standard
Specifications for Highway Bridges - a completely different fatigue
design method that was revamped in the 1974 interim edition. "The poor
fatigue details on the truss spans, particularly those inside the main truss
tension chords that are difficult to inspect, have raised concerns on the
the consequence of a possible main truss member failure triggered by a
fatigue crack." The 1961 AASHO specs don't account for "bending moments" on
truss members; only "axial force" is accounted for.
- URS developed a 3D model to simulate stress on the bridge. Pages after 169 contain bridge failure simulations.
- Page 171-174 have eerie wireframe simulations of bridge collapse: computer-generated ghosts of future events. Page 174 shows middle span failure resembling the collapse video released yesterday.
- Page 176 indicated a single upper chord main truss member collapse would cause more than a dozen floor trusses to fail under eight different simulated load conditions
- Page 231 has a drawing of major internal collapse of center simulated from a single truss chord failure
- Page 236 explores retrofit schemes: "Due to the nearly double symmetry of the structure, these eight members actually represent thirty-two truss members on the bridge." Carbon-fiber reinforced polymer plating (CFRP), which "would be expected to take over the member forces" but would be difficult to apply and "determined inappropriate" as a potential patch. Pre-tensioned bars are deemed inappropriate due to non-satisfactory performance
- Page 265 considers high-performance steel plating as the most suitable. Design loads were determined from the 3D computer model, and new plates would have to be installed extremely carefully to avoid increasing stresses.
- Page 267 says replacing the deck would provide better strength by more widely distributing the load.
- Page 299: in the conclusion someone underlined the passage: "it is more desirable to keep this symmetrical loading condition during deck replacement as much as possible," meaning that load symmetry across both sides should be maintained while work is underway, since removing either the northbound or southbound decks alone would introduce even more stress to the structure.
The Bridge Inspection Report (4 pages) has all the noted inspection issues going back to the 1970s. Current highlights include Element 412: "Relief joints need re-sealing"; Element 131: "Main truss members have numerous poor weld details (some cracked tack welds)"; Element 984: Drainage: "Pier 6: horizontal drain trough has inadequate slope (usually clogged)."
The March 2001 University of Minnesota Fatigue Evaluation of the Deck Truss of Bridge 9340 by Heather M. O'Connell, Robert J. Dexter, P.E., and Paul M. Bergson, P.E., conducted by the Department of Civil Engineering, used strain gages to measure the effects of load stress upon the bridge members.
- Researchers installed "on main trusses and floor truss to measure the live load stress ranges." While trucks of known weight crossed the bridge, researchers measured the stress gages then developed computer models to calculate stress ranges throughout the deck truss.
- The Abstract notes "the bridge's deck has not experienced fatigue cracking but it has many poor fatigue details on the main truss and floor truss system," and they concluded that "fatigue cracking of the deck truss is not likely." The project also "verified that the use of strain gages at key locations combined with detailed analysis help predict the bridge's behavior."
- Pages 54-57 have interesting charts of stress measurements
- After page 68, simulation data renders results impressively similar to their field stress tests. That's some quality computer modeling.
If bridge replacement is significantly delayed, the bridge should be re-decked. The design of the main river spans do not allow for deck widening. Any re-decking contract should also include a complete re-painting of the superstructure, elimination of the hinge joint in span #2, and reconfiguration of the deck drainage system.Long Term Repair Recommendations included:
• Fatigue cracks at girder #1C (NBL), crack at the diaphragm bottom cutout, NE side measures 2" (“front face”) and NW side measures 2-½" (“back face”). Fatigue cracks a girder #3 (NBL), crack at the diaphragm bottom cutout, measures 1-½" (both sides). The cracks are located in negative moment regions where the diaphragm web stiffener was not welded to the top flange and were previous fatigue cracks occurred and were repaired in 1998 and 1999. These areas should be inspected next year for any lengthening of the cracks and drilling of possible stress relief holes.
• Span 3, stringer #7 NB, has a 1-½" crack in the web with one 2" hole drilled. It is recommended to drill a 2" hole at the other end.
[....]During the 1998 inspection, numerous fatigue cracks were found in spans #3 - 5 and #9 - 10, the approach spans. The cracks were located in negative moment regions where the diaphragm web stiffener was not welded to the top flange. At one location the web had cracked through entirely. Most existing cracks were drilled out, and the fractured beam was reinforced with bolted plates. To reduce the stress levels, the diaphragms were lowered. Due to the widespread cracking, these areas should be inspected in-depth on an annual basis.
• The long term plans for this river crossing need to be defined with replacement, redecking, etc. Due to the “Fracture Critical” configuration of the main river spans and the problematic “crossbeam” details, and fatigue cracking in the approach spans, eventual replacement of the entire structure would be preferable.Under "Immediate Maintenance Recommendations":
Four-stringer connection bolts, all in the NBL, need replacement. At panel point #8, stringer #2 has 2 loose bolts, and the bearing block has rotated. This will likely require jacking the superstructure. Stringer bolts also need replacement at panel point #8, stringer #4, south side, and at panel point #11, stringer #3."Areas of concern - future inspections" included:
• Several strip seal joints are leaking. The glands have ripped or pulled out. Attempts were made to replace these joints during the 1998 repair contract, but the steel extrusions, which anchor the gland, had severe corrosion, and new glands could not be installed. Instead, a new product was used at the, SBL, south abutment. This utilized a hot pour seal with wire mesh reinforcing. The final product looks similar to a strip seal gland. We should monitor this joint to see how well this new gland repair performs, and consider using it at other locations.
• The truss end rocker bearings & main truss bearings should be measured for movement during each annual inspection. The truss end floor beams & approach end “crossbeams” should be closely inspected. They have section loss, had flaking rust & fatigue cracks (open finger joint).In the section "BRIDGE DECK: NBI CONDITION CODE 5," MnDOT engineers noted:
• The hinge joint in span #2 is locked in full expansion several beam-ends are contacting, and the hinge bearings are “frozen” and no longer functioning. Consequently, pier #1 has tipped slightly to the north, and the south abutment bearings are in full contraction. This area should be thoroughly inspected.
Structural Slab: Underside of the deck has a moderate amount of transverse leaching cracks, with some areas of leaching map cracks & spalling, particularly in the south approach spans. In 1998, the median coping overhangs were replaced with steel stay-in-place forms, and the exterior copings were repaired with shotcrete. During the median slab removal, the bays adjacent to the median were damaged - some of the “stool” concrete along the stringers & beams has spalled off with exposed rebar; and in some locations, the spalling extends into the underside of the deck.In the section "BRIDGE SUPERSTRUCTURE: NBI CONDITION CODE 4":
[.....]Open Finger Expansion Joints: Deck has three open finger joints, one above the hinge joint in span #2, & one at each end of the truss spans. In 1999, rubber “skirts” were installed below the truss end finger joints & the drain troughs were removed. Strip Seal Expansion Joints: Strip seal, type “H” joints at the abutments, pier #11, and at five stringer joints in the main truss spans. These were installed in 1978. Strip seal glands have pulled out, with joints leaking, in several locations. Steel extrusions, which anchor the glands, have severe section loss, making gland replacement impossible. In 1998, the south abutment, SBL, gland was patched using an experimental system. Hot poured seal with wire mesh reinforcement.
Poured Deck Joints: The deck has several transverse poured joints, from staged deck construction. All of these joints are leaching below; & at some joints the deck is spalling below.
Paint System: ...Currently, the overall paint system is approximately 15% unsound. The truss members have surface rust corrosion and pack rust at the floorbeam & sway frame connections, and there is paint failure & surface rust corrosion in scattered locations. The floorbeam trusses & stringer ends have surface rust corrosion at the stringer expansion joints. Some of the areas re-painted in 1999 have severe section loss. This includes the sections of the floorbeam trusses & sway bracing located below the median, and the truss end floor beams & “crossbeams”, located below the open finger joints.Parts of "BRIDGE SUBSTRUCTURE: NBI CONDITION CODE 6":
Main Truss Members: The two steel deck trusses are comprised of “built-up” welded members; connections include both rivets and bolts. While most truss members are welded box beams, some tension vertical & diagonal members are welded “H” beams. The truss members have numerous poor weld details. The vertical “H” beam truss members have transverse welds at the floor beam connections. The box beam truss members have welded interior stiffeners. Some of these have tack-welded tabs. Many of these tack welds have cracked. Some box beams have tack welds, or tack welded backer bars along the interior corners. The truss members have surface rust corrosion at the floor beam and sway frame connections. Pack rust is forming between the connection plates. There is paint failure, surface rust, and section loss, flaking rust in scattered locations. The interiors of the box members have severe pigeon debris. In 1999, screens were placed over openings in the truss members to prevent pigeon access. This unfortunately prevents inspection of the interiors. During the 2004 inspection, & every two years after, the plastic pigeon screens are removed on all tension and reversal members to visually inspect the member’s internal diaphragms. Any questionable welding flaws discovered during this inspection were tested with magnetic particle equipment.
Floor Beam Trusses: There are 27 floorbeam trusses connecting the main deck trusses. These trusses are comprised of rolled H-beams with welded connections. The floorbeam trusses cantilever beyond the main truss on both sides. They are connected to the main truss, vertical members with bolts & rivets. The floorbeam truss members have numerous poor welding details, including plug welded web reinforcement plates, and tack welds & welded connection plates located in tension zones. Some of the top chord splices are offset vertically, up to ½" – from original construction. The splice plates are bent. The floorbeam trusses below stringer joints have section loss, severe flaking rust. There is pack rust and surface pitting at the main truss connections. In 1999, the floor beam sections below the median were re-painted. Some areas have section loss with holes.
Steel Multi-Beam Approach Spans (spans #1 - 5 & #9 - 11): [....] In span #2, multi-beam approach span, there is a cantilever expansion hinge with sliding plate bearings. The joint is closed beyond tolerable limits, possibly due to substructure movement & pavement thrust and is no longer functioning. Some beam-ends are contacting, and some bearing plates have tipped, preventing the joint from reopening. The hinge area, with open finger joint above, was re-painted in 1999. The beam-ends have section loss, moderate surface pitting.
Abutments: The abutments have vertical cracking, with some staining from leaking deck joints. [......]The next section, "Bridge Snooper Field Investigation," reads like an engineer's worst nightmare, complete with photos of rusted beams, missing pins, "tipped" sliding plates, water-saturated decking, a 90° rotated bearing block, missing bolts, two plugged drains, cracked tack welds, and other ominous findings. Along the U5/U6 truss elements (whose collapse was simulated by the July 2006 URS report), MnDOT discovered that "Truss bottom chord, bottom lateral connection plates have spread 3/16" from pack rust." On Panel Point #8' (West Truss Pier #7 Stringer Joint), "Sway bracing center horizontal has 3" x 8" severe pitting & ½" diameter hole; bottom sway bracing has a 2" x 3" hole between stringer #11 & stringer #10," as photos show. While the de-icing system installed in 1999 has thus far not been linked to the collapse, the report notes "Girder #12 has paint failure from leaking de-icing system."
Approach Span Piers: Piers #1 - 5 & #9 - 11, piers supporting the steel spans, consist of concrete columns with a cap. Those adjacent to railroad tracks have lower struts. The pier columns supporting the voided slab spans (piers #12 & 13) are cast directly into the slab with no cap. Pier #1 has tipped slightly to the north. This is related to the hinge failure in span #2. The east column on pier #9 has minor scrapes & spalls from a train derailment in 1969. Pier #11 has extensive shotcrete repairs from leaking deck joint above.
A roster of "previous snooper inspections" indicated the teams have gotten continuously larger since Chester Martin checked it out by himself in 1988. The report's primary authors know the bridge well: Kurt Fuhrman inspected the bridge 11 times since 1994, and Vance Desens inspected it four times since 2001.
In Appendix A, a handy table view of diaphragm crack locations indicates that many cracks were detected in 1998 but never repaired, and in some cases deteriorated further.



